We study a multidimensional screening problem with minimal restrictions on valuations. Our ε-relaxation of the constraints excludes bunching and cycles in the graph of active incentive-compatibility constraints. Therefore, the Lagrange multipliers do exist and enable us in characterizing distortion. In particular, under spatial preferences that include both the Hotelling and the Spence-Mirrlees cases, the solution has a simple planar graph. Consequently, the pattern of distortion is centrifugal, i.e., the points of service are biased towards the low-valuation market segments.
Introduction
The modern theory of screening or non-linear pricing does consider multidimensional goods or services, or/and situations when consumers' valuations for the commodity are not strictly ordered either in a vertical or a horizontal sense (see reviews by Rochet and Stole (2003) , Armstrong (2006) , Stole (2007) ). Vertically ordered valuations in our context mean that they satisfy the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition (SCC). 4 That is, a higher-type agent values the commodity higher, the valuations cross only once at zero and the demands do not cross.
Another popular simplifying assumption originating from Hotelling's linear-city model is the horizontal ordering: all agents are identical, except for the locations of their bliss points in some unidimensional space of quantity/quality. Thus, non-participation by the consumers does not imply a common outside option, but the level of reservation utility is the same for all 1 National Research University Higher School of Economics, pr. Rimskogo-Korsakova, 47, St. Petersburg types. Under both these simplifying assumptions, the conclusions about the solution structure, distortion and informational rent are well known. Vertical ordering ensures eciency at-thetop (the highest-demand type) and a downward distortion below with informational rent for all higher types. Horizontal ordering under monopoly results in overall eciency without any informational rent (see Nahata et al., 2003 , Andersson, 2008 . Without these two traditional restrictions on the preference ordering, similar conclusions become more complicated, but we show that the topic is tractable.
In order to motivate our paper, consider the Hotelling linear city, but consisting of many blocks. Each block is inhabited by a block-specic mass of consumers with a block-specic reservation utility, some blocks may be empty. A monopolist designs a pizzeria chain, serving each block with its own pizzeria, or may leave some blocks unserved. The four questions we address are: How to nd the location/pricing solution? Will the solution be socially ecient or distorted? Will the location pattern be grouped towards the consumers with higher willingness to pay, or dispersed? Who gets the informational rent?
Though formally we focus on monopoly, our intention in the design of the model is also to include indirectly oligopolistic markets with free entry, for example fast-food chain stores. In such situations, when designing a menu for all blocks, each rm considers the existing price/location bundles of other rms as given multiple outside options, which becomes a feature of our paper.
We study mainly product lines (screening) in one-or two-dimensional quality-spaces, both for a general case and also under a specic spatial class of preferences, somewhat dierent from two most standard classes of preferences (Spence-Mirrlees or Hotelling).
More specically, this paper considers a discrete product line for discrete consumer types.
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The setting is almost standard but for the two features. The rst is dierent outside options for dierent consumers. A rare example of multiple outside options in screening theory is Rochet and Chone (1998), who study bunchingsame bundles for dierent types of consumers. We use this feature to build a bridge from monopolistic to oligopolistic free-entry screening that remains inadequately explored. Our second and the main novelty is the ε-relaxation of the incentive-compatibility constraints. It allows us to get rid o essential bunching (see denitions in Section 3). Then, Proposition 1 guarantees the existence of the Lagrange multipliers (we enforce similar proposition from Kokovin et al., 2011) . Because of bunching the existence of the Lagrange multipliers has remained problematic so far in the screening theory. This question is important, because the multipliers are the key to nding solutions and in characterizing distortion in non-trivial situations. Furthermore, the relaxation enables us to completely characterize the class of possible graph structures for screening solutions: they are in-rooted acyclic graphs (Kokovin et al., 2011) . The envy-graph of a solution is the list of its active incentivecompatibility constraints, perceived as arcs directed from the envying (almost eager to switch) agent to the envied quality-tari bundle.
After some preliminaries, Theorem 1, without any essential restrictions on valuations, states that similar to SCC the direction of distortion is always governed by envy directed from a high-demand consumer to a low-demand consumer, the lower types get the distorted bundles and the higher types enjoy the informational rent. Extending this result from SCC to the general case may seem trivial. However, our necessary and sucient conditions and the mistakes in the previous literature (discussed together with the theorem) show that there are complications. In particular, in dening envy the literature broadly confuses between active and binding con- straints. The other complication arises in dening a higher demand consumer when valuations are non-ordered. For example, suppose an Internet provider serving several types of consumers designs a product line characterized by the trac volume per month. Assume that the adults' maximal valuation for the rst minute (or the chock-price) is higher than for teenagers, but the latter are eager to consume more trac. In this case: Who has the higher demand? Is such family of preferences vertical or horizontal? We suggest it to be judged by the market outcome:
horizontal market should mean no envy at the solution, whereas vertical one means a linear structure of envy. From our propositions one can see that no envy is the outcome, if and only if, the peaks of net-of cost valuations are not strictly below each other, and it is (generically) the only case when overall eciency and zero informational rent appear. However, we believe that real life rarely provides such clear-cut horizontal or vertical outcomes and this motivates our study.
Having above in mind, in Section 5 we supplement the known relaxed Spence-Mirrlees conditions (see Araujo and Moreira, 2010 ) with one more. Our denition of Hotelling-SpenceMirrlees preferences includes both polar cases, vertical and horizontal, and bridges them together with all intermediate realistic situations. This family of preferences can be called spatial, because each consumer type is characterized mainly by her bliss point and her personal reservation utilitypersonal outside option. Under such (not too specic) restriction on preferences, the graph structures become much more specic than all in-rooted acyclic graphs , revealed without the restriction. Namely, in a one-dimensional quality space the graphs are shown to be linear or weakly linear (Theorem 2), and this not only is true for prot-maximizing solutions, but also for any incentive-compatible plan. This enables us to understand envystructure of socially-ecient or oligopolistic solutions. Similarly, in a two-dimensional quality space Theorem 3 establishes that any incentive-compatible envy-graph is a planar one, i.e., the arcs of envy on the plane do not cross. Thereby, the distortion caused by envy is transferred only to the neighbor of any bundle, and the direction of distortion becomes understandable.
Corollaries to Theorems 2 and 3 state that the prot-maximizing solutions under monopoly should have the centrifugal pattern of distortionfrom the hills to the valleys , i.e., from the locations (bliss points) of high-willingness-to-pay consumers towards the areas with lower willingness-to-pay consumers (see Figures 2, 3 ). This location pattern looks counter-intuitive because it means that generally the service-points should be biased towards low-income areas away from the high-income areas.
Generally, our examples and ideas express our doubts in the applicability of strict SCC or purely horizontal preferences to any real-life product lines. Moreover, our approach opens a question for empirical economists. Which product line observed in real markets relates to what type of solution structure, and where can eciency/distortion be a plausible diagnosis? We add that our ndings for monopolistic screening can be extended to mechanism design problems and other situations with incentive compatibility, because the envy-graphs methodology developed here applies there as well (see Vohra, 2008) . Section 2 formulates the screening model with relaxation, Section 3 presents our approach to graph theory in screening and the background results: no-bunching and no cycles under relaxed constraints. Section 4 presents the general results related to eciency, distortion and informational rent, for any types of preferences. Section 5 studies the specic solution properties under the spatial preferences: specic graphs, patterns of distortion and examples. Section 6 concludes and the Appendix contains some proofs.
Model
Our discrete screening model is somewhat more general than the standard one, because the restrictions on functions are relaxed, a constraints-relaxation parameter is added and multiple outside options are allowed. We formulate the model for a monopolistic seller, but have in mind all other usual interpretations and applications of screening, including principal-agent relations, Pareto-ecient allocations, etc. (see Rochet and Chone (1998) and Rochet and Stole (2003) ).
Moreover, we expect the structures of incentive-compatible solutions to be similar in the other areas of mechanism design and not just screening.
Consumer types are indexed by i ∈ I N = {1, ..., N }; and m i > 0 is the frequency of type i, which can be either the probability to participate in the market, or the total number or mass of such agents (consumers). Multiple agents of the same type can also mean multiple purchases by one individual. The quantity-or the quality-tari bundles are denoted by (x i , t i ), where x i ∈ X denotes the l-dimensional vector of attributes of the bundle purchased by the agent i.
Here X ⊂ R l denotes a consumption set, which can be discrete or continuous, and the product of such sets is X N = X × X × ... × X ⊂ R N l . When 0 ∈ X, this zero bundle may denote the common outside option which is non-participation, otherwise outside options may be multiple.
Tari t i is the monetary transfer from consumer i to the rm. We assume quasi-linear utility functions-??
where V i is the monetary valuation of a purchase. In the particular case of a common outside option of non-participation 0 ∈ X, valuations can be normalized as V i (0) = 0. For a more general case we assume k ≥ 1 outside options which are some xed quantity-tari bundles produced by other rms and non-participation amounts to outside options set K ≡ {(a 1 , b 1 )..., (a k , b k )} (0, 0) available to each consumer (see Figure 2 ). For some propositions we additionally assume dierentiability, but otherwise do not restrict V i , X.
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A monopolist selects a subset I n ⊆ I N of n ≤ N types of consumers to be served and oers a product or a service using a menu of several packages of dierent quantities or qualities at some xed taris on a take-it-or-leave-it basis (under 0 ∈ X the monopolist can set n ≡ N and just assign x i = 0 to agents not served). Afterwards the agents self-select. The seller knows the possible characteristics of the types and their probabilities but cannot discriminate personally.
The cost function is quasi -separable :
where f 0 ≥ 0 stands for some xed cost and c(·) : R l →R is the cost function per-package.
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We use the standard assumption that the producer designs only one package for each type, thereby plans an assignment, (x, t) = {(x i , t i )} i∈I n , and from the equivalent choices an agent selects whatever the principal prefers (friendly behavior). The prot π is the dierence between the total taris and the total costs. After introducing a constraint-relaxation parameter ρ ≥ 0 π(x, t, ρ) = i∈I n
, s.t.
(1)
Here (2) and (3) represent the incentive-compatibility (IC) constraints, and the participation constraints respectively. A plan (x, t) satisfying (2)(3) is called ρ-feasible. The admissible set for (x, t) dened by these constraints is denoted as Z(ρ) ⊂ (X n , R n ).
A solution (x,t) to the problem (1)(3) under ρ = 0 is the standard screening solution. More generally, under ρ ≥ 0 a solution (x,t) to (1)(3) is called here a relaxed ρ-specic solution, or just a ρ-solution.
The main focus of our study further is on ρ-solutions with ρ > 0, because relaxation implies acyclic solution graphs, without sacricing modelling of reality (under small ρ).
8 Moreover, we have found (see Kokovin et al., 2011 ) that when ρ → 0, the relaxed solutions converge to the non-relaxed solutions.
To complete the setting, it should be added that under a quasi-separable cost
it is possible and standard to normalize. It means considering the normalized net-of-cost valu- 
becomes the reservation utility of each consumer, the seller cannot serve her by giving less utility. Then the initial screening problem (1)-(3), obviously, amounts to the normalized screening program to be studied further:
3 Graph notions, graph structures and Lagrange multipliers Now we introduce some graph theory notions and our approach to applying them to screening and incentive-compatibility problems. The terminology and the methodology are not standard so far. For example, Brito et al. (1990) speak of eliminating cycles of binding incentive constraints among separated types, some dierent terminologies appear in Guesnerie and Seade 8 Economically speaking, a relaxation parameter ρ can be interpreted as the cost of switching for the agent i from her usual package (x i , t i ) to some new package k. One could try to make ρ negative instead of our ρ ≥ 0, for modelling a premium to the agent for not switching and designing a strictly incentive-compatible menu that ensures strictly-dominant-strategy implementation of solutions. Unfortunately, ρ < 0 does not exclude dicycles, and often undermines the existence of solutions.
9 It is worth recalling that welfare-maximizing screening under restriction on total costs is an equivalent problem, reciprocal to prot-maximization (see e.g. Brito Standard terms for digraphs. A directed graph or digraph G (hereafter just graph ) is a collection of nodes (vertices) denoted as i ∈ G and of arcs (oriented edges) (i, j) ∈ G . Each arc, denoted as i → j or equivalently (i, j), describes an active constraint of our screening problem so that multiple arcs in direction i, j and loops (i, i) are excluded. In each i → j, the arc's tail i is the adjacent predecessor of j, and the arc's head j is the adjacent successor of i. A source is a node without predecessors (with 0 in-degree). A (local) sink is a node without successors (0 out-degree). If the sink is unique and is reached from all nodes, it is called an in -root or, hereafter, just root of this (rooted) graph. A node without adjacent arcs is disconnected. A walk is a sequence of adjacent nodes and edges {i 1 , e 12 , i 2 , e 23 , i 3 , ..., i n } = {i 1 → i 2 → i 3 → ..., i n }; a path is a directed nonempty walk with distinct nodes, i.e., not a loop (not i → i ). When there is a unique directed path from any node to the root, then this graph is called an in -tree, hereafter just a tree, and the simplest tree is a star {i 1 → i 0 , i 2 → i 0 , ..., i n → i 0 }. A spanningtree of graph G is a subgrapha tree containing all nodes of G. An (in -)rooted graph is a digraph with a unique sink (in-root) when this root is reachable from every node through a path. Obviously, any in-rooted graph contains one or more spanning-trees. A closed directed
, and a digraph is acyclic if there are no dicycles. A partial order among nodes i 1 , ..., i n can be viewed as an acyclic digraph when order relation i j is equivalent to arc i → j ... In addition, the following notions and the notion of preorder dened in Appendix.
New terms: rivers and ows. Any in-rooted acyclic digraph is called a river. Obviously, all trees are rivers but the latter may also contain bypasses dened as two directed paths
with the same source and the same sink (see Fig.1 below for illustration). A ow-graph in our context is a 2-colored digraph such that all sinks and maybe some other nodes are colored as drains, the remaining nodes becoming non-drains.
Obviously, after connecting all drains of any ow-graph to some additional node (root), this ow-graph becomes a river. Thereby each acyclic ow-graph can be perceived as a river without its root. There is one-to-one correspondence between rivers and acyclic ow-graphs.
We call a digraph a directed chain when it consists of unique directed path {i 1 → i 2 , →, ..., i n } having all nodes distinct (no repetition or branching). We call a graph (piece-wise) linear or when each of its connected component is a chain or has an underlying undirected chain.
Graphs application in screening. In applying graphs to screening, all agents' identities #1,...,#n are treated as nodes whereas constraints are interpreted as envy arcs within a related envy graph. In this graph, the non-participation option is considered as an additional node with the label #0. It must succeed all sinks and can succeed other nodes. More precisely, our optimization program (1)(3) has n × (n − 1) + n = n 2 inequalities and all can become active, i.e., equalities. For any feasible plan (x, t) we dene its envy A-graphḠ(x, t) as the listḠ(x, t) = {(i 1 , j 1 ), (i 2 , j 2 ), ...} of all constraints that are active at (x, t) (double-bar over G highlights equalities as the basis of denition and for a non-feasible plan (x, t) we similarly dene the strict-envy graph G < (x, t) as the list of all violated constraints). The direction of
, in the direction of a possible choice of consumer switching. It means that an agent i (weakly) envies package #k, being indierent between her package and #k, almost eager to switch to #k. The opposite direction of arcs, chosen in Rochet and Stole, seems inconvenient for this interpretation and for the use of ow networks in screening. Finally, the notationḠ −0 (x, t) =Ḡ(x, t) \ {#0} means further the unrooted graph, where the root node #0 is deleted, but the related arcs remain as the indicator of drain. Thereby, this graphḠ −0 (x, t) is the ow-scheme uniquely related to the plan (x, t). 
But, is it also the graph of binding constraints (those that inuence the optimal value when relaxed or eliminated)? No, the participation constraint 3 → 0 is excessive, it became active just occasionally. We now introduce B-graphs and LA-graphs related to solutions, and explain their relationships to A-graphs under our ρ-relaxation. First note that even under concave valuations V a screening problem (1)- (2) is typically nonconvex. It is so because concave functions enter into both sides of the inequalities. Therefore, for any non-convex optimization, a distinction becomes important between an active constraint and a binding constraintthe one which inuences the optimal value when relaxed or eliminated.
Generally, a binding constraint need not be active and an active one need not be binding, see example (7) below. So, screening may also need B-graphs representing all binding constraints, not only A-graphs.
In addition, there could also be a need for a LA-graph, which is dened as the list of all LAconstraintsthose having strictly positive Lagrange multipliers (see our Proposition 1). This LA-graph generally may dier both from A-graph and B-graph, and even from their intersection.
The typical reason for the discrepancy among these graphs is due to the so-called bunching situation. Bunching means identical packages (x i , t i ) = (x j , t j ) = ... are assigned to dierent agents i, j,... at the optimum. Such an outcome is known to be quite a regular case in standard screening with ρ = 0, see Rochet and Chone (1998) for a thorough treatment of bunching. In a bunch, naturally, all the bunched agents do envy each other, thereby creating a dicycle in the A-graphḠ(x, t) and an over-constrained situation. Bunching and more general dicycles create major hardships in characterizing and nding solutions, mainly because the usual constraintqualication conditions fail and then the existence and nding the Lagrange multipliers become problematic.
In contrast, under positive relaxation (ρ > 0), dicycles and bunching among predecessors and successors are excluded in A-graphs as shown in Lemma 2 below. The Lagrange multipliers do exist and most often become unique. Additionally, based on our experience with solutions, (only) under positive relaxation, A-graph almost always coincides with the LA-graph. The latter is most useful one for solution characterization, whereas the former is more easily observable at any admissible plan.
To appreciate the dierence between A, B, LA constraints and related hardships with characterizing optima, consider a simplest over-constrained non-convex example, where the constraints display all three kinds of importance:
Clearly, here the optimum isx = −1, and the constraint (iii) is binding, because it cannot be dropped and keep the optimum intact, but (iii) is not active or LA. In contrast, the two constraints (i) and (ii) are active but not binding, because any one of these two constraints can be removed without changing the solution. Each can either be LA or not, because any
Lagrange multipliers λ A , λ B ≥ 0 such that λ A + λ B = 1 are admissible. Unfortunately, none of these multipliers λ i reect the sensitivity of the objective function to the related constraint, as it should. However, for a small price for accuracy, we can exclude this indeterminacy and weakness of λ i . We can remove the over-constrained situation by slightly relaxing one of the constraints, (i) or (ii). Such harmless trick is common in linear programming to exclude cycles.
In screening, like in linear programming, our ρ-relaxation helps to overcome all over-constrained situations and cycles. This discussion motivates our focus mainly on the relaxed screening problems and on envy A-graphsḠ(x, t). Hereafter, what we have in mind is these kind of graphs when we drop A and mention just envy graphs. Lemma 1: (in-rooted envy-graph). For any ρ-solution (x,t) its envy-graphḠ(x,t) is in-rooted, i.e., each node i is connected to the root (#0) by a directed path i → ... → 0. Thus, G(x,t) contains a spanning-tree.
Lemma 2: (profits order). Take any ρ-solution (x,t) under quasi-separable costs
from any agent is not lower than the contribution from any of her successor in the envy-graph, i.e., i → ... → j ⇒τ i ≥τ j ,; (ii) under ( ρ > 0) this inequality is strict: i → ... → j ⇒τ i >τ j , and for the adjacent couples i → j it has the particular formτ i ≥τ j + ρ, whereas bunching among predecessors and successors ( x i = x j ) and other dicycles are excluded.
The above two lemmas imply the following lemma on acyclic solution structures.
Lemma 3: (envy-graphs are rivers). 10 For any ρ-solution (x,t) to a screening problem with quasi-separable costs and positive relaxation ρ > 0, its envy-graphḠ(x,t) is a river.
Note that bunching (x i = x j ) among the predecessors and the successors is excluded, it remains possible only for the disconnected packages that coincide accidentally.
11 Unlike the usual bunching, the accidental bunching can be ignored because it has no impact on characterizing solutions. 
(ii) The Lagrange multipliers of the constraints successive to any i are bounded as 10 Reducibility of cycles in A-graph of the main problem (with more restrictions on v i , C than here) was proven in Guesnerie and Seade (1982) through the same simple Lemma 2, and is repeated in subsequent papers.
11 Such solution can be called regular; bunching is excuded among prdecessors and successor (it may occur only ocassionally among nodes not connected by a path).
m j ∀i; (13) moreover, when the river G λ + is a tree, the positive multiplier for the unique successor of i is found as
Proof: see Appendix.
In essence, the proposition above provides FOC and a method for practically nding solutions under relaxation, though it does not formulate a sucient condition for the optima, it only gives the necessary one. Typically the reason is a non-convex optimization in screening, even under strictly concave net valuations v i (·) (see Section 3). Therefore, for nding a solution through this characterization, one should explore all possible rivers G λ + , and then compare prots from these locally-optimal solutions. So far, this method is the only practical way for arbitrary valuations, and Proposition 1 provides justication for it.
Interestingly for nding the solutions, any screening problem can be interpreted as a ownetwork . In our context it is an acyclic ow-graph F supplemented with incoming ows m i ≥ 0 assigned to all nodes, ultimate out owing magnitudes λ jj < 0 assigned to certain nodes (drains), and current-ow magnitudes λ ij ≥ 0 assigned to all arcs. Then the equation (8) Under the usual SCC, it is a common knowledge that whenever a bundle is envied it is distorted and conversely, a bundle free of envy is free of distortion. Economic intuition suggests that such equivalency should hold also without SCC. This section generally supports this conjecture but with some cautions, and provides rather comprehensive results on distortion. They turn out to be dependent on the above analysis.
We use the following denition of distortion, rather standard for a separable screening problem like (4)(6).
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Definition: An allocationx i designed for the i-th agent is called (partially ) ecient or non-distorted whenx i maximizes the joint welfare of this agent and the principal, regardless of all other packages in the menu (x,τ ). That is,
In the opposite case, the package and the allocationx i are called distorted for the i-th agent (the same quantityx i can be ecient for i, but distorted for some bunched j :x j =x i ). The 12 In contrast, without separability or/and quasi-linearity of utilities (as in Guesnerie and Seade (1982) ), the distortion notion becomes tedious, dependent on other packages. is concave but v 1 is only quasi-concave. One can check that the socially ecient quantities are: x 1 = 4, x 2 = 4. However, the prot-maximizing menu is (x 1 ,τ 1 ) = (1, 4), (x 2 , τ 2 ) = (4, 7) with prot equal to 11, and it has no active IC constraints, though constraint #2 → #1 is binding, preventing a better incentive-incompatible plan (x 1 , τ 1 ) = (4, 5), (x 2 , τ 2 ) = (4, 7). A similar socially ecient incentive-compatible plan (x 1 , τ 1 ) = (4, 5), (x 2 , τ 2 ) = (4, 5) brings less prot, only 10, compared to (x,τ ). Thus, only participation constraints active is not a sucient condition for overall eciency without concavity or strict quasi-concavity.
Now we turn to more complicated necessary and sucient conditions for distortion in terms of active or LA constraints. These can be formulated as aggregate envy to a given packageas follows.
Assumption DC: The net-valuations v i are continuously dierentiable and concave on an admissible space X = R l . The solution (x,τ ) studied is characterized by the rst-order conditions (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) , the set of admissible multipliers supporting this solution is denoted as Λ = Λ(x,τ ).
Theorem 1 (distortion and lagrange-active constraints): Let the assumption (DC) hold at some solution (x,τ ). If the gradients of valuations satisfy the inequality
13 We are grateful to Larry Samuelson for suggesting this very intuitive formulation/ interpretation.
for all supporting Lagrange multipliers λ ∈ Λ(x,τ ), then the package (x j 0 ,τ j 0 ) is distorted. Conversely, when this relation becomes an equality for some supporting λ ∈ Λ(x,τ ), then this package is non-distorted.
Corollary (distortion direction):
14 Suppose that only one agent k shows LA-envy towards a package (x j 0 ,τ j 0 ) in the sense min λ∈Λ λ kj 0 > 0, λ ij 0 = 0 ∀i = k, and argmaxima for these two net-valuations do not coincide: arg max z v j 0 (z) = arg max z v k (z). Then the allocation x j 0 is distorted. Moreover, for a unidimensional commodity ( l = 1) a bigger envying package (x k >x j 0 , k → j 0 ) implies that the envied packagex j 0 is undersized (x j 0 < arg max z∈R v j 0 (z)), and the opposite relation (x k <x j 0 , k → j 0 ) implies an oversized packagex j 0 .
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To complete the eciency analysis under non-specic valuations, we should mention two simple, generally known in the literature, facts that follow from Lemma 2 and Theorem 1:
(1) Overall distortion cannot occur, at least one bundle is ecient ; (2) Assume convex X, concave v, and only the participation constraints being active (i.e., A-graph being a star ), then overall eciency results.
Again, the need for concavity/convexity here is surprising but supported by the same counter-example (Example 1). All the claims above are illustrated by our Figures 1, 2 and 3.
Special Case: Spatially Heterogeneous Population
In this section we assume a one-or a two-dimensional continuous real space X of quality/quantity characteristics, and population having a spatial structure. It means that all agents have the same or approximately the same shape of net-of-cost valuations v i , but each agent i has her individual (socially ecient) bliss point b i = arg max x∈X v i (x) ∈ X and her individual maximum h i = max x∈X v i (x) = v i (b i ) the height of the valuation that she can pay if participating. Based on such parametrization in a one-or a two-dimensional space X of characteristics, we impose a restriction on the family of preferences that can be called a Hotelling-Spence-Mirrlees condition. Then, at the solution, the population of the agents gets partitioned into groups, each group being ordered in the spirit of Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition. Such regularity allows to reduce the domain of possible solution structures dramatically to very simple (linear or planar) classes of graphs.
Assumption HSM. We assume that the net valuation functions v i (·) of all agents are continuous, strictly concave and have non-coinciding bliss points b i = arg max z∈R v i (z) such that for any couple of types i, j and the direction ∆ = b j − b i ∈ X, the valuations satisfy the non-normalized single-crossing condition:
so that along this direction the dierence v j (z) − v i (z) is a strictly increasing function, whereas these two curves cannot intersect more than once.
In a one-dimensional space X = R need not intersect at 0, or even need not intersect at all. We shall need also a more special assumption of this kind, amounting to spatial preferences, formulated as follows.
Assumption HSM+. Let all agents' net valuation functions v i (·) be generated by some common strictly convex non-negative distance function w, such that
where b i are the bliss points and h i denote the highest possible net tari. Thus, agents dier only in their bliss points and the demand heights, but not in the shape of their valuations.
These two versions of spatial preferences have a clear interpretation in one-dimensional space as follows.
5.1
One-dimensional quality We are ready now to bridge these two classic cases together and prove that, for the same reasons as for these two extremes (vertical and horizontal), all other preferences satisfying HSM+ or HSM also generate rather simple class of ow-graphs, which are linear but for bunching.
We dened above a piecewise-linear graph so that each of its connected component becomes a chain when we neglect the directions. Thereby it does not have any (directed or non-directed) cycles or branching. Now we modify this denition as follows.
Definition. A ow-graphḠ −0 is called weakly-linear when its non-ordered underlying graph is weakly-linear, i.e., it becomes linear when any bunch of nodes is perceived as one node.
At the expense of one additional new notion, we call such graph a multi-centipede because it consists of ordered connected chains connected either tail-to-tail or head-to-head. They always stay on their heads, since each sink is a drain (see Fig.2 ). The drains look like legs touching the ground. This analogy helps us to discuss solutions and their properties. All tails are nondistorted, the heads are almost-always distorted, and the intermediate segments are distorted always.
Now, for a given number of agents served, we prove weak linearity of our graphs through arguments similar to the usual SCC case. The dierence lies only in a special treatment of bunching and varying directions of envy.
Theorem 2. Assume HSM preferences in a one-dimensional space X = R and agents ordered according to their bliss points b 1 < b 2 < ... < b n , so that the dierence v i+1 (z) − v i (z) is a strictly increasing function . Consider any incentive-compatible plan (x,τ ) ∈ R 2n with n agents served under any relaxation ρ ≥ 0. Then: 16 Similarly, for any function w, the heights are adjusted as h i : v i (0) = 0 to give SCC.
(i) The order of the incentive-compatible qualitiesx i weakly preserves the order of the bliss points in the sense ∀i, j : b i < b j ⇒x i ≤x j . Moreover, under ρ > 0, strict inequalityx i <x j holds for all i, j connected in the A-graph (no bunching, except maybe for the disconnected neighbor sinks). 17
(ii) The graph ordering is also predetermined by the bliss points; the solution ow-graph G −0 (x,τ ) is weakly linear, being positioned on the quality axis through connecting all distinct qualitiesx i =x j by their envy-arcs i → j (if any) and joining equal quantities into a bunched node. Under ρ > 0 this graph is linear, moreover, each agent i cannot envy anybody except the two neighbors of types i − 1 and i + 1.
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Proof. In our arguments, we exploit types numbering b i < b j ⇔ i < j.
(i) under ρ = 0, to check the types' order preservation for quantities for any i, j, we use their incentive compatibility constraints v i (
, and summarize them as:
Comparing this inequality with (15) we reach the conclusionsx i <x j ⇒ b i < b j and b i < b j ⇒x i ≤x j because the dierence v j (z) − v i (z) is a strictly increasing function. Under ρ > 0 the logic is the same, the relaxation does not change it. Further, under ρ > 0 there is no bunching by Lemma 2 among the adjacent nodes:x i =x j . We postpone the remaining claim in the parenthesis because it needs the graph structure.
(ii) To check the order of the types is preserved in the graph, one can use the same logic of increasing dierences v i+1 (z) − v i (z). We conclude that when the incentive-compatibility constraint i → i + 1 is satised at (x,τ ) then together with the satised constraints i + 1 → i + 2, ..., it amounts to satisfying the envy constraint from i to any higher than i + 1 type j (with j = i) as a strict equality:
The same logic works for the lower types i − 2, .... Thus, all non-bunched with i non-neighbor types are not envied by i (moreover, these constraints can be eliminated from the initial problem and replaced by x 1 ≤ x 2 ≤ ... ≤ x n ).
From the same logic it follows the absence of any free (disconnected) node x k lying strictly between connected nodes i → j: ∃k :
We have thus found that among distinct nodes only the neighbors in peaks can be adjacent in the A-graph, and the nodes #1 < #2 < ... < #n are linearly ordered on the quality axis corresponding to x 1 ≤ x 2 ≤ ... ≤ x n . Thereby, connecting these points x i with relevant arcs of envy fromḠ −0 (x,τ ) we must get a (piecewise) linear graph on this axis, and (ii) is proved.
What remains to be shown is that neighboring tails of the centipedes cannot be bunched by accident. Since they are the tops of the graph, they remain non-envied. This conrms that they are non-distorted, x i = b i (see Corollary below for more details) and from the assumption of dierent peaks b i < b i+1 it follows their non-bunched quantities.
To appreciate the reduction in graphs' variety that the assumption HSM brings, note that here active can be only ties among the neighbors: left arrow or/and right arrow in the graph (i → i + 1 or/and i ← i + 1 ) and nothing else. Therefore, the number of possible (linear) 17 Actually, as one can see from the proof, this claim i is true for any incentive compatible plan, optimal or not. Another enforcement is the claim that, for any valuations family v parametrized with the bliss points b i and heights h i , under ρ > 0 any (even nonessential) bunching is a zero measure case. That is, it appears with probability 0. To show this, it is sucient to disturb the bunched bliss points or heights in any direction and the bunch disappears.
18 It follows that when any two distinct nodesx i =x j are adjacent in this graph (i → j), there does not exist
Now, using the proposition obtained and Theorem 1 about distortion, we get the natural conclusion about how distortion/eciency depends upon the bundle's position in the graph.
We consider some agent i's bundle (x i , t i ) envied from both sides, when arcs x i−1 → x i and x i+1 → x i are present in the A-graph.
Corollary. If the plan (x,t) is prot-maximizing under HSM and valuations v i are differentiable, then: (a) all non-envied nodes (sources) inḠ −0 (x,t) are non-distorted, (b) a node envied from both sides may or may not be distorted, (c) each node envied from one side with a positive Lagrange multiplier is distorted.
Proof. Here (a) and (c) follow immediately from our theorem, but for the nodes envied from both sides we must show examples of distorted and non-distorted outcomes. It is sucient
calculation show that it is also prot-maximizing, and the symmetry of left and right neighbors of agent #2 entails equality (14) in the form λ 12v1 (x 2 ) + λ 32v3 (x 2 ) = 0 and hence non-distorted x 2 (in spite of envy and λ 12 > 0, λ 32 > 0). When we use the same logic in the reverse direction by introducing any asymmetry in this example, say, v 3 (z) = 2 + ε − (1 − z)
2 , we get distortion.
It appears rather plausible from arbitrary ε > 0 here, that the envied but non-distorted bundles are the rare degenerate cases. Now we should compare the variety of distortion outcomes with two classic polar classes:
vertical and horizontal proles of preferences. The former was already shown to be a special case of our assumption HSM+, the case generating the linear graph n → (n − 1) → ... → 1 → 0 with distortion everywhere except n. The latter prole is another special case with uniform heights of valuations: h 1 = h 2 = ... = h n . It generates the disjoint graphḠ −0 resulting in overall eciency of bundles. More generally, even without the uniform heights, a prole can be called quasi-horizontal when it generates the disjoint graphḠ −0 , and one can easily realize that for any function w there is a non-degenerate region of parameters b, h that generates overall eciency. However, our class HSM+ includes many other interesting outcomes in addition to these polar two, and appears almost as tractable as these two. We illustrate such analysis and possible distortion outcomes by Example 2 below.
Example 2. Consider a product line (x, τ ) designed for the population of 6 consumer groups. Let the frequencies (sizes of the subpopulations) m ≡ (m 1 , ..., m 6 ) = (1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1) and
2 for a one-dimensional quality x, depicted in Figure   2 . In the upper panel, three non-common outside options are shown by yellow. Option (#1, #2) is available for these two agents and thus determines their reservation utilities. Option (#3, #5) is available for agents #3, #5. Somehow, options #4 and #6 are available only to these two groups. These outside options may be the bundles designed by a competitor and assumed to be given for the monopolist. In the lower panel the prot-maximizing points (x i ,t i ) are shown in red and it occasionally happens that only x 1 = 0.66666 gets distorted. The reason is that the point (x 4 ,t 4 ) is symmetrically envied from both the sides, whereas another envied (but non-distorted) point (x 6 ,t 6 ) just 
5.2
Two-dimensional spatial preferences Theorem 2 about a at and an order-preserving solution graph is generalized now onto a twodimensional quality space. However, we use specic assumption HSM+ with X = R 2 and quadratic distance function, i.e, quadratic valuations
sometimes also called gravity preferences .
A graph is called a planar one when it can be displayed on a plane without any intersecting arcs. We call it weakly-planar when it becomes planar after treating each bunch as a single node. This property is established as follows.
Theorem 3. Assume two-dimensional quadratic preferences (16) , and any ρ-incentivecompatible plan (x,t), then: (i) It generates a weakly-planar ow-graphḠ −0 (x,t), which can be positioned on the quality space X = R andx j are the ends of the hypotenuse and b j belongs to the cathetus starting at b i .
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Proof. Take any ρ-incentive-compatible plan (x, t) and display its envy-graphḠ on a quality plane, each couple (x i , x j ) becoming an arc when (i → j). Our goal is to show that these linear arcs do not intersect. Whenever (x i → x j ), both points must lie on the active surface W i (and the envied point j belongs also to surface W j ). It is easy to show that the projection of the intersection of any couple of surfaces, W i and W k , is a straight line {(
2 . Indeed, powers 2 here cancel each other and the equation becomes linear. Naturally, all points envied by i lie on one side from this line (closer to i because belonging to its surface), but all nodes envied by k lie on the opposite side (closer to k), see Fig. 3 . Thereby, non-intersection of any couple of envy-arcs i → j and k → l becomes clear. The arcs x i → x j and x k → x l just belong to dierent half-spaces of the plane, each containing its envying agent: x i or x k respectively. For any ρ-incentive-compatible plan (x, t), the logic is exactly the same only all active surfaces become a little (for ρ) lower than under ρ = 0.
. We now illustrate the use of envy-structures for discussing the direction of distortion among prot-maximizing packages or locations.
Example 3: (monopolistic-location rule). In Figure 3 the envier's summit, and thereby can be called envy pressure from the envier. Under two enviers, the direction of distortion reects their weighted envy pressure on the envied node.
Moreover, the amount of distortion is larger when the weight of the envier is bigger (that can be derived from the optimality conditions). Thus, assuming similar costs at all locations, the rule of monopolistic location distortion in such situations can be formulated as centrifugalfrom the hills to the valleys , i.e., the network of supply points is distorted relatively to the network of the demand points towards least willingness to pay and away from the highest willingness to pay.
This seems counter-intuitive: we expect more shops located on the street that is populated by the rich rather than on the one populated by the poor. However, our expectations may result from (frequently observed) other market structures: oligopoly or free-entry oligopoly similar to monopolistic competition. These may have the opposite location rule. If it is true, then by observing pro-centric or anti-centric location pattern we can conjecture about the underlying market structure, is it essentially monopoly (tacit collusion) or oligopoly. It could help to rationalize the location choices of producers.
Example 4: Can we empirically reveal the kind of envy-graph for some observed product line? For instance, in a liquor shop a typical menu of packaging many brands of whisky contains 0.75, 1.0, 1.75 liters in quantity dimension and young , middle and very old in quality dimension (measured by the age of the whisky). This overall amounts to 9 points of service like in Figure 3 .
22 Our intuitive conjecture is that 1.0 liter bottle of the middle quality has the highest price-cost margin or net tari. Thereby, this middle package should serve as the top of the graph, whereas border packages should have quality and quantity distortion in the opposite directions: too small sizes for small bottles and too big for the bigger one, similar to the distortion in Figure 3 . Empirical study can show if it is really the case or not.
Conclusions
We have used a quite general setting to study discrete screening without the single-crossing condition (SCC). Our technical novelties include constraints relaxation that makes the analysis more tractable, and extensive application of graph theory to screening problems. A modelling novelty is multiple outside options in screening, which enables one to extend the screening methodology and envy-graphs onto product lines in oligopoly and reach several conclusions.
(1) Regarding distortion in general case, we conrm the commonly held belief among economists that the usual eciency at the top and distortion below remains true even without SCC, but we provide some important clarications. The top now means any source of the solution graph, and below refers to its successors. Specically, a bundle is distorted if and only if non-zero is the aggregate envy (the sum of envying utility gradients weighted by their Lagrange multipliers) towards this bundle. This aggregate gradient also determines the distortion direction: it is opposite to the envy pressure.
(2) To get more denite predictions about distortion (for the price of some additional restrictions), we introduce a new and promising spatial class of preferences bridging Hotelling and Spence-Mirrlees assumptions. These preferences enable us to characterize the solution graphs as linear or planar, i.e., every bundle envies only its neighbor(s). The direction of distortion in 22 However, unlike our 9-towns example, consumer types in the whisky example can be of continuous nature and preferences need not follow the gravity pattern, so our model does not apply strictly.
monopolistic product lines becomes clear: distortion is centrifugal in quality space from the bliss points of the high-demand consumers towards the low demands.
Further we plan to study an extension to oligopoly with competences: does it show the same pattern of distortion as monopoly? Also, it would be interesting to study in the same fashion a free-entry oligopoly, where consumers are continuously spatially heterogenous (between Hotelling and Spence-Mirrlees cases), with discrete points of service.
Generally, by our examples and theorems we would like to convince the reader that considering non-vertical and non-horizontal envy structures in product lines can be practical for rms to design their optimal menus, and for researchers to rationalize some specic patterns observed.
7 Appendix: proofs 23 It is very similar to what we are proving now but for positive relaxation ρ > 0 and our idea is to expand this statement onto the case ρ = 0 by a limit transition that uses additional assumption of unique maximum. We construct an innite sequence of all local argmaxima with their Lagrange multipliers and study any such couple (z (n) , λ (n) ) ρ→0 → (z * , λ * ).
This limit (z * , λ * ) (of the sequence or some of its subsequence) must exist because variables z = (x, τ ) are bounded by our assumption on bounded x : v i (x) > 0. Also bounded are variables λ ∈ [0,M ] :M = max G {M G } due to relation (13) holding for all ρ > 0 (Proposition 4 from Kokovin et al., (2011)). One of such limits (related to one of local maxima) must coincide with our global maximumz = z * of the unconstrained problem. It is so, because the relaxation ρ > 0 keeps the global maximum feasible and the objective function cannot increase in ρ discontinuously atz : ρ = 0, sincez is supposed to be unique (or at least isolated). It is common in optimization that when we continuously expand the admissible set, the argmaxima changes continuously at the points where it is unique. Thus, there is a sequence (z
converging to our global maximum. Further, since the number of possible graphs is nite, the sequence must contain a subsequence with the same list G λ (n) of LA-constraints for whole tail of the sequence. So, all the needed equalities and non-strict inequalities (8) (13) x i 0 ) , the bigger t i 0 can become, but t i 0 is maximized and no other constraint restricts prot contribution t i 0 from the above. Therefore some constraint of this type is binding, and at the argmaximum (x,t) of prot, the function v i 0 (.) also reaches its unconstrained maximum at the quantityx i 0 . This means thatx i 0 is non-distorted . Claim (ii) is obvious.
Further, we shall need the following auxiliary claim: [concavity and LA-envy-free i 0 ⇒ ecient x i 0 ]. To prove by contradiction, supposex i 0 is not the unconstrained argmaximum of v i 0 (.). Then, under concavity of v i 0 , in any close vicinity ofx i 0 there is a pointx i 0 (actually, many points) bringing higher value v i 0 (x i 0 ) > v i 0 (x i 0 ) (an alternative assumption of strict quasiconcavity works similarly). By no-LA assumption, there exists some ε > 0 such that relaxation of all constraints of the type (j, i 0 ) : v j (x j ) − t j ≥ v j (x i 0 ) − t i 0 for this amount ε, the solution remains unchanged.
Then the additional welfare v i 0 (x i 0 ) − v i 0 (x i 0 ) > 0 from the new better pointx i 0 situated in ε-vicinity ofx i 0 could be distributed between the agent i 0 and the seller. In fact, by constructing a new package (x i 0 ,ť i 0 ) one can increase the prot π without violating any constraints. This can be done by slightly increasing the net tariť i 0 =t i 0 + δ enough to not violate constraints with direction (i 0 , j): v i 0 (x i 0 ) − t i 0 ≥ v i 0 (x j ) − t j . These constraints have some slack v i 0 (x i 0 ) − v i 0 (x i 0 ) now, and constraints (j, i 0 ) have some slack by LA-free assumption. But, the increased prot contradicts the optimality ofx. This proves thatx i 0 ∈ arg max x i v i 0 (x i ).
Claim (iii): [concavity, weakly-A-envy free i 0 ⇒ ecient x i 0 ]. By weakly-A-envy free we mean absence of envy from any agents not bunched with the one studied. Under the nobunching case, obviously, if a package (x i 0 ,t i 0 ) is A-envy-free, it also is LA-envy-free, so the claim just proved applies (one can also repeat similar concavity arguments for an independent proof ).
Now we prove the same no-distortion claim for the case of a group of consumers K = {i 0 , ..., k} :x k =x k−1 = ... =x i 0 , bunched together with this package i 0 : v j (x j ) − t j = v j (x i 0 ) − t i 0 ∀j ∈ K and not envied from outside. Can their incentive-compatibility constraints comprise a cycle causing a distortion? Suppose there are one or more agents from this group whose welfare function v j does not attain maximum at the equilibrium point, i.e.,x j ∈ arg max z v j (z).
Take a small ε > 0 and denote a small ε-vicinity ofx i 0 as: B(x i 0 , ε) := {z ∈ R l | ||x i 0 − z|| ≤ ε}, small enough so that all IC constraints to i 0 , which are strict inequalities at the pointx i 0 (those (j, i 0 ): j ∈ K) remain satised under all z ∈ B(x i 0 , ε) also, witht i remaining xed. Continuity of v i (which follows from concavity on R l ) allows us to build such B. Now maximize among agents and points and denote an agent by k whose welfare function v k attains the maximum value within B(x i 0 , ε) among all {i, ..., k}, so thať (v j (z) − v j (x i 0 )).
proved that the relation k =j 0 λ kj 0v kr (x j 0 ) = 0 ∀r is the necessary and sucient condition for no-distortion. If this equality holds for any λ satisfying the FOC, then it holds for all such λ.
In other words, inequality k =j 0 λ kj 0 ∇v kr (x j 0 ) = 0 ∈ R l for all λ (aggregate LBA-envy from some agents) implies distortion. 
